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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
A1'LAS CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
DO~ALD T. ADAMS, ORYILLE GUN-
rrl IEH, A. PRATT KESL1'JR, and RAN-
SO~I QFINN, MEMBERS OF TIU~ 
Sl'Arl'E TAX COl\HIISSION OF UTAH, 
and GI~OROI1J vV. BARBEN, EXECU-
'lT\~J·~ 81~Cltr~TARY OF THE STATE 
'i',\X COJ\Il\LISSlON OF l~TAH, and THE 
:--;'t'A'l'T1J TAX CO.:'IE\llSSION OF UTAH, 
Def cndants. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case 
No. 
10522 
'l'his is an original action in the Supreme Court of 
l'tah in which plaintiff seeks issuance of a Peremptory 
Writ of Prohibition prohibiting defendants from execut-
ing upon certain warrants issued by defendant, The State 
Tax Commission of Utah, against all of plaintiff's real 
and tangible personal property in three counties, for the 
lJUq>ose of imposing personal liability upon plaintiff for 
payment of rPal property taxes assessed against two 
worthless mining properties, and from requiring that 
plaintiff personally furnish security for the payment of 
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such taxes, and from in any other manner seeking to 
collect such taxes by means other than the sale of the 
property taxed. On .January 4th, 19GG, this Court issued 
an Alternative -Writ of Prohibition and Order to Show 
Cause why the Peremptory ·writ of Prohibition prayed 
for should not issue. 
The jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine 
this case and to grant the relief requested by plaintiff is 
expressly provided by Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution, and by Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, and Rule G5B ( b) ( 4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The issues presented in this action are urgent public 
questions of general importance to the State of 1:Jtah 
and its citizens. Defendants have not been content to 
abide by the decision of this Court in San Juan County 
and State Tax Commission of Utah v. Jen, Inc., 16 U.2d 
394, 401 P.2d 952 ( 1965), and to seek a solution to their 
grievances through legislative action, but, with apparent 
disdain for that decision, have endeavored to circumvent 
it. Defendants' actions discredit the authority of this 
Court and that discredit must be rectified by this Comt. 
Defendants' unconcerned resort in this isolated instance 
to summary warrant proceedings for the collection of 
these real property taxes threatens the integrity of the 
Utah tax system. An early determination of the issues is 
in the interest of the parties and the public and is neces-
sary to prevent irreparable loss and damage to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's verified Complaint and Petition for vVrit 
of Prohibition sets forth in detail the facts necessary to 
the decision of the issues here presented. Defendants 
have stipulated to the truth of the factual statements 
contained in paragTaphs 1 through 28 of the Complaint 
and Petition. Based upon these facts, plaintiff contends 
that the taxes in question do not constitute a personal 
obligation of plaintiff and that the actions of defendants 
are unconstitutional. 
Defendanh; claim that the summary warrant pro-
cedure applied by them in this case for the collection of 
real property taxes from plaintiff entitles the Commis-
sion, forthwith upon docketing the warrants, to institute 
a ~heriff's sale of all of a taxpayer's real and tangible 
iwrsonal property in the State, the same to be accom-
plished without the necessity of notice to the property 
owner, without l't'gard to any limitation as to time, and 
without any right of redemption of property sold through 
the t-iheriff's sale. Plaintiff contends that the drastic and 
harsh procedures advocated in this case and actually em-
ployed by defendants as against plaintiff are repugnant 
to tht> real property tax laws, customs and concepts of 
the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation duly qualified 
to engage in business in the State of Utah. Defendants 
are the members and executive secretary of The State 
'rax Commission of Utah and The State Tax Commission 
of Utah. (For convenience, where The State Tax Com-
mission of Utah is referred to hereafter separately from 
the remaining defendants, it is referred to as the "Com-
mission.") 
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Plaintiff is engaged in the mnung, t•xtraeting and 
processing of uranium and vanadium ores in l~talt and 
owns or operates various mining properti<:>s from which 
it mines such ores. Plaintiff's mining properties were 
assessed by the Commission for the year l!)(j5 for 
real property taxes pursuant to tlw provisions of t:)e(·-
tion 59-5-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides 
for the assessment of metallifrrous mining properties on 
the so-called ''net proct>eds" basis. Plaintiff has paid all 
19G5 real property taxes exct~pt such taxPs as~wssed 
against the Mi Vida Mine and the South Almar ~line 
situated in San Juan County, Utah. Both of thesP mines 
were depleted prior to January 1, 19G5, and on January 
1, 19G5, and throughout the year 19G5 were valueless. 
Dcf endants have asst~ssed taxes against the 1\li Vida 
Mine for 1965 in the sum of $248,312.59, based upon an 
assessed valuation as of January l, 19G5, of $5,988,342.00, 
and have assessed taxes against the South Almar 1\Ii1w 
for 19G5 in the sum of $2G8,022.H, based upon an asspssed 
valuation as of January 1, 19G5, of $G,4G3,GG7.00. These 
assessed valuations are equal to two times the average· 
net annual proceeds n•alized from the operation of tlH• 
.Mi Vida and South Alrnar 1\Iines rPspectivdy for the 
calendar years 1962, 1963 and 1964. 
On .July 9, 19G5, the 1Commission served upon plain-
tiff a demand for security for payment of the 19G3 
and 19G6 real property taxes assessed against all of plain-
tiff's mining rmlperties, including the 1\li Vida and 
South Almar 1\lines. In dne course, plaintiff paid all 
taxes assessed against its mining pro1wrties except the• 
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taxes assessed against the l\li Yida and South Almar 
Mines. Upon plaintiff's refusal to furnish the de-
manded security, defendants initiatt>d jeopardy proceed-
ings, and served upon plaintiff a Notice of Jeopardy 
Assessment, pursuant to which a hearing was held before 
the Commission, at which plaintiff filed a written protest 
to the jeormrdy proceedings. Defendants, on November 
10, 1965, by written decision, declared the 1965 real 
property taxes assc>ssed against the Mi Vida and South 
Alrnar l\li1ws to be in jeopardy. 
Defendants then initiated in the name of the Com-
rni;,;sion and San Juan Com1ty an action in the San Juan 
County District Comt seeking to restrain all plaintiff's 
01wrations, irrespective of the property upon 'vhich con-
ducted, and to obtain appointment of a receiver to take 
possession of and hold all of plaintiff's properties. De-
fendants' application for preliminary injunction and ap-
pointment of a receiver was heard before the Honorable 
F. \V. Keller, who, on December 3, 1965, rendered a Memo-
randum Decision denying the requested injunction and 
the request for appointment of a receiver. On December 
S, 1965, the Commission and San Juan County voluntarily 
di:•nnissed the pending action in the San Juan County 
District Court. 
On ~ecember 1, 1965, defendants, presumably acting 
pmsuant to Sections 59-5-79 and 59-5-80, and possibly 
Section 59-10-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, served 
upon plaintiff a Notice and Declaration of Taxes in J eo-
1iardy, and pursuant thereto, on December 6, 1965, de-
fondants docketed warrants in the sum of $516,335.00 
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m the offices of the County Clerks of Salt Lake, San 
Juan and Grand Counties. Defondants assert theil' 
right to effect collection of the 19G5 real property taxes 
assessed against the l\li Yida Mine and the South Almar 
Mine by execution upon these warrants, which are a 
cloud upon plaintiff's title to all real and tangible rier-
sonal property owned by plaintiff and situated in the 
three named counties. 
On December 10, 1965, the Commission filed with 
the Salt Lake County District Court an Affidavit for 
Issuance of Execution and a Notice of Motion for 
Leave to Issue Execution seeking sanction from the 
Salt Lake County District Court for execution upon 
the warrant docketed with the Salt Lake County Clerk. 
On December 14, 1965, plaintiff initiated an action 
against the Commission by the filing of a Complaint 
in the Salt Lake County District Court, seeking to en-
join the Commission from executing upon the war-
rants theretofore docketed, from enforcing personal lia-
bility against plaintiff for payment of the subject taxes, 
and for a declaratory judgment concerning the rights 
and duties of the parties. At the same time, plaintiff 
also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The 
Commission's Answer to, and Motion to Dismiss, plain-
tiff's Complaint were filed on December 15, 1965. On 
December 20, 1965, plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, the Commission's Motion for Leave to Issue 
Execution upon the warrant docketed in Salt Lake County 
and thP Commission's Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Com-
plaint were heard before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, 
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who granted the Commission's Motion to Dismiss plain-
tiff's Complaint and entered judgment accordingly. 
As noted above, the taxes in question were assessed 
against two mining properties known as the Mi Vida 
and the South Alrnar Mines, which were valueless 
on January 1, 1965, and throughout the year 1965. No 
operations were conducted upon these properties during 
191i3. No ores were mined from these properties in 1965. 
No proceeds whatever 'vere realized from production of 
ores from these properties in 1965. 
'11 0 the knowledge of the parties, neither defendants 
nor any of their predecessors in office have at any time, 
in the administration of the real property tax laws of 
this State, sought to collect taxes on real property by the 
su1111nary procedure of docketing warrants enforceable 
personally against the owner of the properties. The use 
of warrants has been limited to cases where there is un-
questioned personal liability, in an unquestioned amount, 
for payment of taxes other than real property taxes. No 
effort has ever been made by defendants or any of their 
predecessors in office to collect any taxes on real prop-
erty by personal action against the owner or operator of 
the property except in the case of uranium and vanadium 
mining properties. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Plaintiff relies upon the following points to support 
issuance of a Peremptory vVrit of Prohibition herein: 
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POINT I. 
THERE IS NO PERSONAL LIABILITY FOH 
REAL PROPER'l1Y TAXJ£S, INCLUDING 
SUCH 'l'AXES BAS1£D UPON AN ASSESS-
ED V ALUA'l'ION DEHTVJ£D F'RO.:\I "NE'l1 
PROCEEDS." 
POIN'r II. 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE RJ£VE~UE AND 
TAXATION CODE AUTHORIZJNG ISSlL 
ANCE OF AND 1'JXE.CUTION 1:-PON -WAR-
RANTS FOR THE COLLECTIOX OF l'N-
PAID TAXES DO NOT RELA'rJ~ OR APPLY 
TO THE 1COLLECTION OF THE UNPAID 
REAL PROPERTY TAXES SOUGHT 'I'O 
BE .COLLECTED BY DEFENDAN'rS FROi\I 
PLAINTIFF HERJ1JIN. 
POIXT III. 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE RE\TEXTTT£ AKD 
TAXA'l'ION CODE AU'l1 HORIZING 1'HE 
CO~U.TISSION TO Rl~QlTlRE DEPOSIT OF' 
SECURITY FOR THE PAYMENT OF REAL 
PROPERTY TAXES ON URANIUM AND 
V ANADlUl\l MINES DO NOT GIVE RISE 
TO PJ<:JRSONAL LIABILITY FOR SUCH 
TAXES. 
POINT IV. 
UTAH CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY HI-
POSJ~ A TAX FOR THE YEAR 19G5 ON 
THE PROPER11 Y INVOLVED IN THIS 
CASE BECAUSE SAID PROPERTY \VAS 
\VOR1' HLESS THROUGHOUT SAID YJ~AR 
AND 'J1 HE TAX BEARS NO REASONABLJ~ 
RELATION 1'0 THE ACTUAL V ALUliJ OF 
THJ~ PROPEH11 Y. 
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(A) THE FOGRTEENTH Al\lENDl\IENT TO 
'11 HE CONS'11 ITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATJ~S; 
( B) AR'l'ICLE XIlI, SECTIONS 2 A~D 3; 
AHTICLI~ YI, SECTION 2G(S); AND 
ARTICLE I, SECTIO~ 24, CONSTITlT-
TION OF PTAH. 
POINTY. 
THE PHUVlSIONS 01<' 'l'HE Rl~\'ENUE 
AND TAXA'l'ION CODE, IF DEEl\IED TO 
GIYE RISE 'rO PEHSONAL LIABILITY, 
CONSTITPT1'~ AN ARBITRARY AND UN-
I{ l<~ AS 0 NAB L J<; CLASSIFICATION OF 
URANTFM AND \'ANADIU:M MINES IN 
\' IOLA'rION 0 F T HE FOURTEENTH 
Al\11~ND1IENT TO THE CONSTITUION OF 
'rHE UNITED STA'I':b~S AKD ARTICLE YI, 
SI£iCTION 26(8) AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 
2-t- OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
'rHI'JRE lS NO PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR 
REAL PROPERTY TAXES, INCLUDING 
SUCH TAXES BASED UPON AN ASSESS-
ED VALUATION DERIVED FORM "NET 
PROCEEDS." 
'rhis question was squarely presented to this Court 
in 1965 in the case of San Jiian County and State Tax 
Commission of Utah v. Jen, Inc., 16 U.2d 394, 401 P.2d 
952 ( 19G5). This Court rendered its decision in that case 
on May 17, 1965. After full consideration of the entire 
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question, which was brit'fed thoroughly and argut>d ably , 
for the Commission by counsel appearing in this action ' 
on behalf of defendants, this Court held ''that the tax upon 
real property is a charge upon the property and not in 
the nature of an in personam obligation of the owner. ... " 
This holding is clearly consonant with the prior decisions 
of this Court ( Crisnwn v. Reich, 2 U. 111; Citizens Coal 
Co. v. Capitol Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 120 U. 285, 233 P.2d 
377 (1951); Crystal Car Liue v. State Tax Commission, 
110 U. 426, 174 P.2d 98-1 (l94G) ), and ·with the decisions 
of other Courts interpreting ancl applying statutory pro-
visions equivalent to the provisions of the Utah Code. 
(Board of Commissioners of Ness County v. Hooper, et 
al., 204 Pac. 536 (Kan. 1922); Calkins v. Smith, 78 P.2d 
74 (Mont. 1938); State ex rel. Spokane and Eastern Trust 
Co. v. Nicholson, County Treasurer, 240 Pac. 837 (Mont. 
1925); Santos v. Simon, 138 P.2d 89G (Ariz. 19-13); Mari-
copa County v. Arizona Tractor & Equipment Co., 109 
P.2d G18 (Ariz. 19-±1); McDonald v. Ducku:orth, 173 P.2d 
-136 (Old. 19-16); Allen v. Henshaw, 1G8 P.2d G25 (Old. 
1946); City of Salem v. Marion County, 137 P.2d 977 1 
(Ore. 19-±3); Pi,gct Sound Power & Light Co. v. Cowlitz 
County, 234 P.2d 506 (Wash. 1951).) 
:Moreover, such holding is consistent with the legis-
lative history of the statutes. It is well established that, 
at the common law, there is no personal liability on the 
part of an O"wner for taxes levied upon his real property. 
(Territory of Alaska v. American Can Company, 269 F. 
2d 471, 475 (9th Cir. 1959); 84 C.J.S., "Taxation," ~ 6-13, 
p. 1318.) A statutory provision is nt>cessary to create such 
personal liability. Prior to 1933, Sections G090, G091 and 
11 
fi092, Compiled La\\·s of l~ tah, 1917, expressly provided 
for a versonal action against the owner of real property 
against which taxes had been assessed that were delin-
quent in an amount of $300.00 or more. These provisions 
were deleted from our statutes with the adoption of the 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 'l'here are at this time 
no provisions giving rise to personal liability for the 
payrnent of ad valorem real property taxes in the Utah 
statutes, and hence the common law rule that there is no 
personal liability for such taxes should and must be rec-
ognized, for the Legislature has expressly adopted the 
eomrnon law in cases not governed by the Constitution 
and laws of the State. (Section 68-3-1, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953.) 
lt is significant that the Commission, in its Second 
Biennial Report rendered October 31, 1934, considered 
at length the difficulty of collecting real property taxes 
on mining properties arising from the exclusivity of 
tho statutory renwdy of sale of the property subject 
to the four-year redemption period. The problem was 
statPd in terms of the possibility that the mining 
pro1wrty preliminarily sold for the taxes might be 
dl'plded during the four-year redemption period, and, 
hence, lack sufficient value when the sale became final 
to satisfy the taxes. After stating this problem, the 
Commission recommended "the amendment of the 
la"· so as to authorize the collection of the tax, with 
venalty and interest, by suit or otherwise immedi-
ately after delinquency." (3 Utah Public Documents, 
1932-1934, "Second Biennial Report of the State Tax 
Commission of Utah," page 23.) The Commission's 
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concern and rec01m11emlation m this n'gard was l'<'-
iterated in its '11 hird Biennial Heport. (See 3 Utah 
Public Documents, 193-l:-193G, "'l'hird Biennial Heport 
of the State Tax Commission of 11 tah," page 2-1:.) Not-
\Yithstanding this reconnrn'ndation, the Legislature has 
never acted to provide a means \\'hereby real property 
taxes may be collected through the assertion of a per-
sonal claim against the property owner. 
Defendants have urged and are urging the LTtah judi-
ciary, including this Court, to give an effect to the Utah 
statutes which the legislative branch of government has 
conside1·ed and repudiated. This is obviously true in 
Yiew of the efforts, of which this Court may take ju-
dicial notice, to have the 1966 Special Session of the 
Utah Legislature adopt a statute expressly providing 
for personal liability for payment of real property taxes 
and by the Legislature's refusal to enaet such proposed 
legislation. (S.B. 8, First Special Session, Thirty-Sixth 
Legislature, 1966.) 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court did not 
ignore or overlook the questions and arguments raised by 
defendants and their able counsel in the Jen case which 
was decided only eight months ago. The Jen decision 
clearly, decisively and correctly determined that then~ 
is no personal liability for the payment of taxes on real 
property, including, in this case as in the Jen case, real 
property taxes assessed against metalliferous uranium 
and vanadium mining properties upon the basis of nrt 
proceeds realized in periods prior to the date of assess-
ment. 
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lt is disturbing that defendants - public officials 
<·harged with the duty of upholding the law - would 
attempt, by the issuance and docketing of warrants and 
threatened execution thereupon and by other action, to 
circumvent and avoid the holding of this Court in the 
Jen case. Defendants' activities are doubly disturbing be-
eause defendants' Petition for Hehearing of the Jc n case 
was expressly based upon Sections 59-5-79 and 59-5-80, 
l~tah Code Annotated, 1953, which sections provide for 
the issuance of warrants for the collection of certain 
taxes, and upon which sections defendants apparently 
rely as authorizing their conduct in this case. The deci-
sion of this Court denying defendants' Petition for He-
lwaring of the Jen case correctly disposed of the contc·n-
tion that the warrant procedure was applicable to real 
property taxes upon metalliferous mining claims assessed 
on the basis of nd proceeds. 
Defendants have suggested that this case can be 
distinguished from the Jen case on the ground that in the 
Jen case the real property that was taxed \Vas sold pre-
liminarily to the county for the taxes prior to the at-
frrnpted imposition of personal liability therefor. How-
ever, it is submitted that the holding of this Court in the 
Jen case is not based upon any theory of election of 
remPdies. Indeed, the Court expressly held that under 
the Utah statutes the sole remedy is to enforce the lien 
uiion the taxed property provided for by the statutes. 
After quoting Section 59-10-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
195:3, the Court in the Jen decision held: 
''From the emphasized language it will be 
noted -;;nat the recourse is to the property, and 
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that the ::;rntute contains no ex11ress indication that 
the ta:x unligation runs to the owner. This court ha~ 
heretofore held that since the legislature has pro-
vided 1his means for the collection of propert)· 
taxes, which is based upon a lien upon the prop-
erty, and has omitted expressing any intent that 
there should be a personal judgment, that no such 
personal obligation e.Tists." (Emphasis added.) (Hi 
U.2d 394, 396.) 
For thP foregoing reasons, plaintiff respectfully sub-
mits that this Court has clearly and correctly resolYed 
the questions raised by defendants by holding in the Jen 
case that there is no such personal liability under our 
statuks. 
POINT II. 
THE PROVISIONS OF·THE REVENUE AND 
'rAXATION CODE AUTHORIZING ISSU-
ANCI£ OF AND EXECUTION UPON WAR-
RANTS FOR THE COLLECTION OF UN-
PAID TAXES DO NOT RELA'l'E OR APPLY 
TO THE 1COLLECTION OF' THI£ UNPAID 
REAL PROPERTY TAXES SOUGHT '1'0 BE 
COLLECTED BY DEFENDANTS FROM 
PLAINTIFFS ITl~RT<JIN. 
Defendants rely upon Section 59-5-79 and 59-5-80, 
and upon Section 59-10-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as authorizing issuance of and execution upon warrants 
as a propf'.r vrocedure for the collection of the taxes in 
question. This argument is not new to this Court. De-
fendants, in their Petition for Rehearing in the Jen case, 
argued that the decision "fails to take into consideration 
Sections 59-5-79 and 59-5-80, U.C.A., 1953, wherein the tax 
commission is directly empowered to seize and sell all 
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real and personal property of a delinquent taxpayer for 
the payment of the tax debt." (San Juan County and 
8tatc Ta.r Commission v. Jen, Inc., supra, Appellants' 
Petition for Hehearing and Brief in Support Thereof, 
page 2.) By its denial of defendants' Petition for Re-
hearing in the Jen case, this Court properly rejected 
tkfrndants' patent misinterpretation of these sections. 
By their terms, Sections 59-5-79 and 59-5-80 apply only 
to a "tax imposed by this chapter. ... " (Section 59-5-79, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.) This section was adopted 
by the lTtah Legislature in 1937 as Chapter 101, Laws of 
Ptah, 1937. Chapter 101 imposed only the Mining Occu-
1iation Tax, now provided for in Sections 59-5-66 through 
i59-5-S5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. That chapter did 
11ot impose and does not impose any tax whatever on real 
property. 
Chapter 101, Laws of Utah, 1937, in addition to 
imposing the Mining Occupation Tax, also amended Sec-
tions 80-5-56 and 80-5-57 (now Sections 59-5-57 and 59-5-
38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953), which sections prescribe 
the mode of assessment of metalliferous mines and min-
ing claims. However, said sections do not impose any 
tax. They are purely administrative and provide for the 
assessment of metalliferous mines and mining claims at 
$5.00 per acre plus an amount equal to two times the 
average net annual proceeds for a preceding period. 
rt'he ad valorem tax on real property is imposed by 
Section 59-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Section 59-
1-1 is not, of course, a part of Chapter 101, Laws of Utah, 
1937. 
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lt is entirely tmd,~rstandabk· that th(; Co11m1il' 
sion be V(:'sted ~with authority to i:::;sne warrants for thl' 
collection of the l\tining Occupation Tax becansl' there is 
personal liability for payuwnt of the Mining Occupation 
Tax. lf the provisions of Sections 59-3-79 and 59-5-80 arP 
limited to the collection of l\lining· Occupation rraxes, no 
problems arise in applying tlw prnvisions to cany out the 
statutory sche1m>. If, howevPr, the said sections are eon-
strued to apply to all real property taxes, including tlu~ 
tax on metalliferous mines and mining claims, many 
statutory prnhlemt> aris(:'. 
It is also clear that Section 59-10-22 was not internl-
ed to apply to the collection of real property taxes, 
for that section, by its terms, relates only to situ-
ations where '"the tax commission shall find that a person 
liable for the payment of any tax which is collectible by 
the tax commission designs quickly to depart from tlw 
State of Utah .... " Renee, the condition for application 
of Section 59-10-22 is that there be a person liable for 
the payment of a tax. It is the express holding of this 
Court in the Jc11 ("asc that no vcrson is liable for the pay-
ment of ad valorern taxes on real prnperty, the tax being 
"a charge upon the prnperty, and not in the nature of ai1 
in personam obligation of the owner .... " (lG U.2d 39-t, 
397.) ·rrherefore, Section 59-10-22 is elearly not apvlie-
able. 
Moreover, Section 59-10-22 relates only to taxes ''col-
lectible by the tax commission .... "Also, Sections 59-5-79 
and 59-5-80 give authority only to the Commission to issue 
warrants. Tlw ad valorem tax on real property, includ-
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ing such taxl'S based on "net proceeds," are payable to and 
collectible by the counties of the State, not the Commis-
s10n. 
The use of warrants under Sections 59-5-79, 59-5-80 
and 59-10-22 is a drastic remedy that subjects all the 
n·al and tangible personal property of a taxpayer to exe-
cntion and sale. Under well established principles, these 
sections cannot be given the effect suggested by defend-
ants in the absence of an um•quivocally clear expression 
that such effect is intended. That intent cannot be found 
in any Utah statutes. 'rhe statutes evidence an intent 
to the contrary. 
POINT III. 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE AKD 
'J'AXATION CODE AUTHORIZING THE 
COMMISSION TO REQUIRE DEPOSIT OF 
SECURITY FOR '11 HE PA Yl'.IENT OF REAL 
PROPERTY 'rAXES ON URANIUM AND 
\-ANADlUM MINES DO NOT GIYE RISE 
'11 0 PERSO,'.I AL LIABILITY FOR SUCH 
'l'AXES. 
Section 59-5-65, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (1965 
Supp.), provides, among other things, a method by 
which the Commission can require that an owner or 
operator of a uranium and vanadium mining prop-
erty deposit security in advance of the due date of 
taxes assessed against such property to insure pay-
ment of such taxes. Without conceding the validity 
of that procedure either generally or as applied or 
sought to be applied in this case, plaintiff submits that 
this procedure was available to defendants and that de-
f<•ndants' 11l'esent position results directly from their 
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failure to utilize or enforce m a ti11wly manner the 
remedy provich'd by this section. 'rhis remed)· has l>een 
available to thP Commission since the amenduwnt of ~re­
tion S9-5-G5 that became dfective on May U, 19G3. llo\Y-
ever, the Commission did nothing to avail itself of that 
remedy until the decision of this Court in the Jen case 
in ~lay, 19G5. Defendants' failure to avail itself sPa-
sonably of express statutory remedies ought not to pro-
vide a basis for defendants' present efforts to create 
other remedies by way of personal liability that the stat-
utes do not provide. 
Indeed. in 1965, defendants finally invoked the provi-
sions of Section 59-5-65 in this case by demanding that 
plaintiff deposit security for the payment of all real prop-
erty taxes that had been assessed against plaintiff's min-
ing properties. Plaintiff has paid and satisfied all of 
such taxes in respect of all propertit>s other than 
the brn pro1wrties involved in this case, the .Mi Vida and 
South Almar l\lines. \Vith respect to tlwsc properties, 
plaintiff has refused the demanded security, and defend-
ants have availed tlwmst>lves of the l'Prnecly Pxpressly 
provided therefor by Section 59-5-65. That n·medy 
does not expressly or implicitly indude a personal daim 
against the person from whom the security is demanded. 
Rather, the remedy is to obtain a decree restraining 
operations on the properties in c1uestion until the required 
security has been deposited. Defendants have abandoned 
the action that they initiated in the San .Juan County 
District Court to obtain such reliPf. Ag·ain, defendants' 
unilah•ral decision not to seek the relief expressly pro-
vided by Sc,dion 59-;"}-G5 for iilaintiff's failure to deposit 
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th(' U('manded SP('Urity in no way 1:,rives rise to a personal 
daim against plaintiff for the taxes in question. 
For the fon•going reasons, plaintiff respectfully 
sulnnits that deft>ndants have and at all times relevant 
to this proceeding have had available to them a wholly 
a<lPllllate remedy to prott-ct their position, which remedy 
dd'l'ndants have not exercised, and that neither Section 
59-5-(i5 nor defendants' failure to exercise the remedy 
tlwrein provided, provide a basis for defendants' present 
assertion that plaintiff is personally liable for the subject 
taxes. 
POINT IV. 
UTAH CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY BI-
POSE A TAX FOR THI~ Yl~AR 1965 0::\1" THE 
PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THIS CASE BE-
CAUSE SAID PROPERTY WAS WOR'fH-
LESS THROUGHOUT SAID YEAR AND 
THE 'l'AX BEARS NO REASONABLE RE-
LAION 'fO THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE 
PROPERTY. 
(A) 'L'HE FOURTEENTH AMENDl\IENT TO 
THI1~ CO~STI'l'UTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES; 
'l'he lower court found and defendants have stipu-
lated in this proceeding that the Mi Vida and South Almar 
::\lines were worthless on January 1, 1965, and throughout 
the year 1965. Notwithstanding this undisputed fact, de-
f'Pndants maintain the validity of assessed valuations 
of $5,988,342.00 on the Mi Vida l\Iine as of January 1, 
1965, and $G,4G3,GG7.00 on the South Almar :Mine as of 
.January 1, 1965, and claim authority, based upon such 
dainwd assessrnen ts, to collect real property taxes 
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m the amount of $2-18,312.59 m the case f the Mi 
Vida Mine and $2G8,022 . .U in th<:> case of the S1 uth Almar 
Mine for said tax year. The question is therefore squan·-
ly presented to this Court vdwther worthle~ property 
can validly and constitutionally be assessed l : the year 
19G5 at an aggregate valuation in excess of $12,000 ' ' J.00. 
In a case presenting a substantially identical oh-
lem under the Utah statutes involved in this cas tlte 
United States Supreme Court has held that the ,,atP 
of Utah cannot constitutionally assess a mining 1 "O}l-
erty for a given tax year upon the basis of net proceeds 
at a valuation not reasonably related to the actual value 
of the mining property assessed at the beginning of that 
tax year. (Smith Utah Mines & Smelters v. Beaver Cow1-
ty, 2G2 U.S. 325, 330-332, 43 S.Ct. 577, 518-580 (192:3).) 
The Bec11:er County case involved an assessment of $:-Hn,-
G-±1.00 with respect to a wholly depleted mine, the valu-
ation being based upon three times the net proceeds real-
ized from operations conducted during the preceding yrar 
in respect of the tailings dump remaining from the prior 
operations. Speaking for a unanirnous Court, Mr. Justice 
Sutherland stated: 
"It follows that a given multiple of the net 
annual proceeds which may be a fair measure 
of value in the early part of a mine's development, 
will become excessive as the stage of exhaustion 
approaches. The constitutional provision, tlwre-
fore, at best, will produce only approximate equal-
ity. Undoubtedly in fixing the multiple of the net 
annual proceeds upon which tlw value of metal-
liferous mines is to he calculated a good deal of 
latitude must be allowed the Legislature and the 
taxing authorities, hut tlw power is not un-
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ho nded. Without attempting to delimit the 
um, 'ldarics-a matter primarily for the state 
cou ·ts-it is sufficient for present pitrposcs to say 
tlw · in our opinion they have ucen clearly ex-
ceer!ei/ in the instant case. To treble the total of 
the .:i proceeds for the purpose of basing thereon 
an 11ltogether fictitious 1x1l?te for a rni11e worked 
out a11d worthless years before.the adoption of the 
statutory provisions supposed to confer the au-
il10rity to do so, results in such flagrant and palp-
able injustice as would cast the most serious doubt 
upon the constitutionality of such provisions if 
thus construed .... 
"It may ·well be that the taxable value of 
mines differing in extent of development or in de-
gree of exhaustion and relatively of different ac-
tual values, must from the practical necessities of 
the case, be subjected to the same rule of measure-
ment, although it may work inequality to some 
extent. But the difference 7Jctween a mine froni 
which ore is still being or still may be extracted 
and net income derive.cl, and one conceded to be an 
empty shell, with no present or prospective value 
1chatsoever, is so obvi011s that the imposition of a 
tax upon the basis of their being, nevertheless, 
one and the same camwt ue sustained with due 
regard for either law or logic." (Emphasis added.) 
(2G2 U.S. 32G at 330-332, 43 S. C. 577 at 579-580.) 
The case now before this Court is squarely within 
hoth the rationale and the holding of the Beaver County 
ease. Plaintiff submits that upon well accepted prin-
ciples of federal constitutional law, the valuation of 
worthless property for ad valorem tax purposes at a 
rnluo in excess of $12,000,000.00, and the levy of a tax 
hasecl on such assessments in an amount Pxceeding 
$500,000.00, would, if sustained, constitute a taking of 
vroperty without due process of law, and a denial to 
plaintiff of tlu~ equal protection of the laws. (In re 
Chicago Rys. Co., 79 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Ill. 19-18), 
affirmed 175 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1949), certiorari denied, 
338 F.S. 850, 70 S. Ct. 9-1, 9-1 L. Ed. 520 (19-!9); Stone 
1°. City of Springfield, lGS N.E. 2d 7G (.~fass. 19GO); 
People ex rel. Ross i:. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co.,±-! 
N.E. 2d 566 (Ill. 19-!2); Appeal of National Bulik of 
Tulsa, 312 P.2d 495 (Okl. 1957).) 
(B) ARTICLE XIII, SIDCTIONS 2 AKD 3; 
ARTICLE YI, SJ;~CTION 2()(8); AND 
ARTICLE I, SF~CTION 24, CONsrrrrru-
TION OF U'l'AH. 
Article XIII, Seetion 2 of the Constitution of l 'tali 
provid0s in relevant part as follows: 
"All tangible property in the state, not ex-
empt under the laws of the United States, or undPr 
this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to 
its value, to be asc0rtained as provid0d b~- law. 
" 
ArticlP XIII, SPction 3 of the Constitution of Ftah 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
"The Legislature shall provide by la\Y a 
·uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation 
on all tangible property in the State, according 
to its value in money, 8.nd shall prescribe by law 
such regulations as shall secure a just valuation 
for taxation of such propert~Y, so that every pPr-
son and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion 
to th0 valrn• of his, h<•r, or its tangible prop0rty 
" 
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Article YI, :Section 26(8) of the Constitution of 
[tali provides in relevant part as follows: 
"The Legislature is prohibited from enacting 
any private or special laws in the following cases: 
( 8) Assessing and collecting taxes." 
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uni-
form operation." 
These several constitutional prov1s10ns express a 
clear and consistent policy requiring that the laws of this 
State, including particularly those laws relating to taxa-
tion of property, be applied even-handedly. 
The actions of defendants in this case patently vio-
late this public policy. Defendants seek payment from 
plaintiff of $500,000.00 in taxes for the year 1965 even 
though the property taxed, the value of which ought to be 
the measure of plaintiff's proportionate tax burden, was 
wholly without value throughout said ta.ox year. 
The cited provisions of the Constitution of Utah 
<>xpress limitations equivalent to those imposed by the 
federal Constitution, as stated by the United States 
Supreme Court in the Bea1:er County case, supra. Plain-
tiff respectfully submits that these federal and state 
limitations, both Federal and State, \Vould be clearly 
neeeded by defendants' attempts in this case, as in the 
Beaver County case, if defendants attempts were suc-
C'Pssful in assessing as metalliferous mines, upon the 
basis of prior operational proceeds, properties that have 
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no vahw, either as mdallif'erons 111inPs or othl•rwise -
properties that, in fact, 110 longer constitute mines at all. 
POINT V. 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE RJ~\TENUl~ 
AND TAXATION CODE, IF DEKl\lED TO 
GIVE RISE TO PERSONAL LIABILITY 
' CONSTirrUTE AN ARBITRARY AND UN-
R EA S 0 NAB LE CLASSIFiiCArrION OF 
URANIUl\I AND VANADIUl\l l\lINES IN 
YIOLATION 0 F '11 HE FOllRTEENTll 
Al\IENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUION OF 
THE UNITED srrA'11ES AND ARTICLE VI, 
SECTION 26(8) AND ARTICL1~ I, SECTION 
2-1 OF THE CONSTI'l1 U'rION OF UTAH. 
Defendants have stipulated that to their knowledge 
neithe1· they nor their predecessors in office have at any 
time in the history of this State attempted to effect col-
lection of real property taxl~S by issuing and executing 
upon warrants. Defendants have also stipulated that 
neither they nor their predecessors in office have at 
any time in the history of this State sought to impose 
personal liability for rPal property taxes except with 
respect to uranium and vanadium mining properties. 
Section 59-5-65, Utah 'Code Annotated, 1953, which de-
fendants have invoked heretofore in this controversy 
in an effort to secure payment of the subject taxr>s from 
plaintiff, applies, b:v ih; terms, only to uranium and van-
adium mining· properties and operators. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that these facts, taken 
together with the deliberate, anomalous and dedicated 
campaign that defendants have undC'rtaken against plain-
tiff, demonstrate that the actions of defendants are arbi-
trary, discriminatory and unreasonable, and hence in 
derogation of plaintiff's rights under the Constitution 
of the United States and the Constitution of Utah. It is 
:-:dtled that a state cannot satisfy the limitations of the 
Fourteen Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States by the imposition of a tax that, as in this case, 
is apvlied differently as to taxpayers of the same class. 
(Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. G62, 69 S. Ct. 
1:291, 9;3 L. Ed. 15-±4 (19-±9); Blaustein v. Levin,-± A.2d 861 
(::\[cl. 1939); Y owigstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. City of 
row1gstown, 108 N.E. 2d 571 (Ohio App. 1951); New 
r ork State Trailer Coach Ass'n v. Steckel, U.-± N.Y.S. 2d 
8:2 ( 1955).) The prohibited discrimination may arise not 
only from the statutory provisions themselves, but also 
from the mode in which the ta.x is administered. (Dehy-
drating Process Co. of Gloucester v. City of Gloucester, 
135 N.E. 2d 20 (l\1ass. 1956); Federal Land Bank of 
lluuston v. State, 31-± S.vV. 2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).) 
The cited provisions of the Constitution of Utah 
import the same standards of equality and due process 
in the application of taxing statutes as do the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
and plaintiff submits that defendants' conduct violates 
both the federal and state constitutional standards. The 
eitt•d provisions of the federal and state constitutions 
prohibit invidious and unreasonable discriminations in 
tlw administration of taxation laws. 
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The stipulated facts show that defendants seek to 
apply different treatment to IJlaintiff in the issuance of 
and execution upon the subject warrants than has ever 
in the history of this State been applied to any owner 
or operator of real property for collection of real prop-
erty ta...xes. Plaintiff respectfully submits that the appli-
cation of the taxing statutes of the State of Utah at-
tempted by defendants in this case must fail because such 
application clearly violates the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States and the Constitution of lTtah. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Jen decision 
correctly states the law applicable to this case. There is no 
personal liability in the State of Utah for real property 
taxes. The statutes of Utah do not give rise to personal 
liability for the payment of real property taxes, whether 
the attempt to impose personal liability is made under 
the guise of a direct action, the use of warrants or any 
other device which the imagination and methods of de-
fendants may devise. Once the fundamental question has 
been decided, as it was in the Jen case, it cannot and 
should. not be circumvented by flimsy distinctions and 
devious procedures. Further, plaintiff should not be sub-
jected constantly to the inconvenience, expense and 
embarrassment of all the prosecutorial procedures de-
fendants can invent in their attempt to create personal 
liability for real property taxes ~when the Supreme Court 
of this State has determined that personal liability for 
such taxes does not exist and the Legislature of this 
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~Hate has refused to create personal liability for such 
taxt>s. To vermit an administrative body to circumvent 
the decisions of this Court or to exercise legislative 
powers would weaken and discredit the stability, consis-
tency and wisdom of our laws and the decisions of this 
Court. 
Adherence to the Jen decision renders unnecessary 
a consideration of the additional Points upon which plain-
tiff relies in the foregoing brief. Only if the clear holding 
of the Jen decision should be overturned does it become 
fi(~cessary to consider the additional Points going to the 
qut>stions of constitutionality under both the federal and 
the state constitutions. Should the deliberations of the 
Court take it to the constitutional questions, it is 
submitted that defendants' actions, both in the assess-
ment of admittedly worthless mining property and in 
th(• isolated use of warrants as against this property 
owner, contrary to anything that has occurred in the 
prior history of this State, must be struck down as 
clParly in violation of both federal and state consti-
tutional provisions. 
There is more at stake in this case than the tax dol-
lars that defendants seek to collect from this plaintiff. 
Dl~fendants' methods to attain their end and vindicate 
their disdain for the Jen decision threaten fundamental 
concepts of law. The time-honored phrase "the power to 
tax is the power to destroy" rings a clear note of warning 
in this case. This case illustrates that there is a fine 
line between responsible and circumspect enforcement of 
law, and misrule. Plaintiff has been intimidated with 
the threat of execution upon all of its real and tangibh· 
personal pro1wrty in three eounties despite the most 
recent decision of this Court that there is no personal 
liability for the payment of real property taxes, and in 
the face of a ck'ar absence of any statutory authority for 
the use of warrants to collect real propert.v taxes. But 
for the relid afforded through a review by this Court, 
plaintiff's real and tangible personal property might nmr 
be sold without the slightest eoncern on the part of de-
fendants. 
If defendants' conduct, and the procedures that they 
have followed in this case, are ~mstainecl by this Court, 
the time may well come when a \\-arrant will be docketed 
against a home owner in January of a given tax year 
without the real property tax on his home having be-
come due or delinquent until the succeeding November; 
an ex parte Sheriff's sale could be initiated and held 
without notice to the home owner, subjecting all of his 
real and tangible personal property in the State to sale; 
nor would a right of redemption from the sale exist, as 
has always been recognized in Utah concerning tax sales 
of real property. Defendants' theories are indeed both 
summary and violent. 
l'laintiff re::;vectfully urges thi::; Court to issue its 
PNP111ptury 'Writ of Prohibition herein and thereby pro-
,;nilH~ tlw actions of th<•::;e State officers who have acted 
irrPsponsihly and without care and circumspection in the 
adlllinistration of the laws of thi::; State and in the exer-
cisl' of the powers entrusted to them. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COT'l', BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & ;\foCARTHY 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON 
LEONARD J. LE,VIS 
DAVID E. SALISBURY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
